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Under this general scheme, an organism is in principle no different from other physical systems, though distinguished by its degree of complexity. Its scientific treatment, therefore, i.e. biology, is ultimately governed by the cognitive standards of physics. Such at least is the abstract postulate which determines biology's method. In fact, however, biology is far from commanding that two-way passage of analysis and synthesis, of induction and deduction, which mechanical physics prescribes as the ideal. At present, analysis of living objects proceeds on selected causal lines, while the synthesis of an organic whole, its intelligible construction from the sum of its elements, is today farther from the reach of theory than is the experimental making of life by means of the te~hniques of the laboratory (where a felicitous chance may intervene). Thus, for example, starting from a whole organism, we may isolate the role of a particular hormone and arrive at an accurate physico-chemical account of its working within the whole whose existence is prelef. the "resolutive" and "compositive" mr:thod of Galileo .
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Vol. XXI, no. I, Oct., 1951 40 THE UNIVEltSlTY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY supposed; but we cannot, starting from the bormone together with all the other separable causal threads, deduce the organic whole, the subject of a single, central, indivisible life, let alone answer the question of how under mechanical laws the collocation of these factors itself can have come about. The enormous complexity of even the simplest organic system is the commonly adduced, but not the ultimate reason for this shortcoming of the "compositive" method in the biological sciences. The inventory of constituent parts, the discernment of patterns, the mastery of techniques for their mathematical handling, may increase indefinitely; it will still be the case that the kind of unity and wholeness involved in organic individuality will transcend the very meaning of the questions that physics (of the modem type) can ask. Biology is as little able to feed its primary elements-the end-terms of its analysis-into a computing machine and have it grind out the form and behaviour of an organism, as a man is unable to tum out Paradise Lost by feeding into the machine the twenty-six letters of the alphabet; though both the organism and the poem undoubtedly do "consist" of their respective elements and no others. What biology can do is to take the whole entity, its Paradise Lost (to pursue the simile), and analyse it-into what? Into its elements of meaning and aesthetic value? No: into the letters or sounds of which it consists, together with the grammatical and phonetic rules of their combination. Herein lies the peculiar crux of biology as the science of life. The equation between a whole and the sum of its parts which marks the success of every other physical inquiry entails here the loss of that distinctiveness which makes a living thing qua living something more than the sum of its parts.
II
Let us try to get at the root of this matter. The problem arises from an ontological fact quite beyond the choosing of scientific classification and methodology. It arises from the fact that life, whatever else it lie, is corporeal in all respects which concern its reciprocal relations with other things-and thus forms an integr;U part of nature as the system of res extensa; while at the same time it transcends mere physical nature with the very first stirring of feeling and appetition. Now science, as understood since its foundation in the seventeenth century, cannot deal with these latter features. Indeed, it was founded on the very elimination of such features from the thought-model of its object, and with the extension of the applicability of this expurgated model, science came to embrace more and more aspects of reality. That this expansion ended by engulfing even the original locus of those features is a paradox unforeseen by the founders of modern science, with their firm dualistic philosophy. Modern biology is the expression of that paradox. It applies a scheme which is essentially the residual of a subtraction, viz. of the zOOmorphic elements in experience, to that which had contributed the subtracted elements in the first place and from which they would seem inalienable. Expatriated from their own birthplace, they are now more homeless in the scheme of science than is Ahasuerus in a world which at least lets him wander in its midst. Each experience, including the scientific undertaking itself, reaffirms the disowned traits by the very act: their claim is bought off by according them a shadowy existence in the no-man's land of "subjectivity," the convenient Hades of natural science, as if this disposed of them and left for scientific description an untainted " objectivity" which need no longer answer for them. As part of this purged objectivity, the physical phenomena of life are but a special case of the lifeless, and life is deemed known scientifically to the extent to which its reduction to non-life has succeeded.
How has this truly fantastic situation come about? The full story exceeds by far the limits of these introductory remarks. It would have to start with animism or primitive panvitalism and travel the whole road through dualism to modern materialism. The length of the road is apparent from the contrast between the two end-positions. In the beginning, life and soul were everywhere, and being was identical with being alive. Bare or "dead" matter was yet to be discovered. In these surroundings, death loomed as the great riddle. Thus it was not life but death which at first called for an explanation. The explanation had to be in terms of life as the only understandable thing; death had to be assimilated to life, by making it a transmutation of life itself. Hence the burial rites of early mankind, the cult of the dead, the pristine metaphysics rising out of the tombs. They meet the profound challenge. To save the sum of things, death had somehow to be denied.
Modern thought is placed in exactly the opposite theoretical situation. Death is the natural thing, life the problem. From the natural sciences there spread over the conception of all reality an ontology, the model entity of which is pure matter, stripped of all features of life. It is the residue of a reduction to the properties of mere extension which submit to measurement and hence to mathematics. These properties alone satisfy the requirements of what is now called exact knowledge. Indeed they, and nothing else, are that which is-oy these standards--knowable in nature. In other words: the 42 THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY lifeless has become the knowable par excellence, and is, for that reason, also considered the true and only foundation of reality. It is the "natural" as well as the original state of things. Consequently it is the existence of life within a mechanical universe which now calls for an explanation, and the explanation has to be in terms of the lifeless. Explaining life means, therefore, negating it by making it one of the possible variants of the lifeless. A negation of this kind is presented by the mechanistic theory of the organism, just as the rites of the tomb contained a negation of death. But even apart from orthodox mechanism, materialistic monism in general is left with this question: how is life reducible to that which is not life?
To recapture from scientific routine the wonderment which this state of affairs deserves, we need to remind ourselves that the corpse, in which "dead" matter primarily revealed itself, was once the limit of all understanding and therefore the first thing not to be accepted at its face value. Today the living, feeling, striving organism has taken over this role, and is being unmasked as a ludibrium materiae, a delusive hoax of matter. Today the corpse is the most intelligible among the states of the body. Here the organism returns from its puzzling and unorthodox bebaviour of aliveness to the unambiguous, "familiar" state of a body within a world of bodies, whose general laws constitute the canon of all comprehensibility. To approximate the laws of the organic body to this canon, i.e., to efface in this sense the boundaries between life and death, is the aim of modern thought on life as a physical fact. Our thinking today is under the ontological dominance of death.
This replacement of vitalistic monism by materialistic monism could not have been reached without the interposition of dualism, whose rise and long ascendancy are among the most decisive events in the mental history of the race. We cannot here go into the very complex history of dualism, but we may point out that death played a potent part in its genesis and conceptual formation. ~W,",d-~ij,",d, the Body-a Tomb, had been, in Orphism, the first dualistic answer to the problem of death, or of life, which was now conceived as the problem of the interrelation of two different entities, l:iody and soul. The body as such is the grave of the soul, and bodily death is the latter's resuscitation. Life dwells like a stranger in the flesh which by its own nature-the nature of body-is truly nothing but a corpse, seemingly alive in virtue of the soul's passing presence in it. With the growth of dualism, the features of the bewildering spectacle from which it had started-the spectacle of the corpse-spread more and more over the face of the physical universe. Death in fact conquered external reality. At the peak of the dualistic development, in Gnosticism, the (Tw~a-(Tr,~a simile, in its origin strictly anthropological, actually applied to the universe. The whole cosmos is (Tr,~a, tomb of the soul or the spirit. There, at bottom, the matter rests to this day-with the difference that the tomb has meanwhile become empty. With the critical evaporation of the hypostatized spiritual entity, of the "something" which could be thought enclosed in that grave or prison, only the walls remained, but these extremely solid. This is, metaphysically speaking, the position of modern materialism which inherited the estate of a defunct dualism, or what was left of it. In the triumph of taking possession, materialism was hardly aware that the left-over to which it succeeded carried a mortgage never to be redeemed from its own resources, viz., the task theoretically to support those phenomena which had formerly been taken care of by the vanished half of dualism's estate. This task had inescapably devolved upon materialism once it established itself, on its partdqmain, as a self-sufficient monism. Its bequest was the secret revenge for one of the greatest usurpations in the history of thought. Actually, materialism can never attain to the legitimate status of monism. For it represents but one side, taken in isolation, of a dualism which had first torn asunder an original one. But materialism continues logically to presuppose transcendental dualism, metaphysically dead though it be, because otherwise it could not keep matter to itself, i.e., free from spiritual attributes that matteI' exhibits in the natural context of life. Only by having unavowedly in the background the other world of dualism could materialism afford to disregard it and to interpret reality as pure "matter." The final exit of dualism, in the sense of a two-substance doctrine, through the ontological abandonment of its spiritual pole, meant the end of classical materialism as well, without the materialists becoming aware of it. In other words, a true monism demands a concept of substance transcending, yet embracing, that aspect which materialism isolated under the name of matter. Thus true monism would mean the overcoming of materialism by a revision of its metaphysical presuppositions concerning matter.
III
The rise of materialism was a function of the rise of modern science. We have, therefore, to ask what made science fasten upon a certain form of dualism as the ontological setting most suitable to its purpose and, once securely entrenched in its half of dualism, made it discard the other half as redundant . The clearest answer is supplied 44 THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY by reference to Descartes and the history of Cartesianism. In its briefest form, the answer to the first part of the question would run, that the new mathematical ideal of natural knowledge was best served by, and indeed required, the clear-cut division between two realms, which left science to deal with a pure res extensa, untainted with the non-mathematical characters of being. That reality in toto was not of this one, desirable kind had been realized by Galileo, whose doctrine of the mere subjectivity of the secondary qualities initiated the extrusion of the undesirable features from physical reality. But subjects themselves are objective entities within reality, and the extrusion of features remained incomplete so long as their dumping ground itself was a part of the world to be described by natural science. Now, Cartesian dualism seemed the perfect answer to this difficulty. Here was one substance whose one essential attribute is extension, whose one essential mode of cognition therefore is measurement and mathematical description; and another substance entirely separate and independent, whose one essential attribute is awareness (cogitatio) , and about the specific mode of whose cognition and description there is far less clarity, but also far less concern. The isolation of the res ,:ogitans was the most effective way of securing the complete ontological detachment of external reality from what was not extended and measurable. Thus, it provided the metaphysical justification for the all-out mechanical materialism .of modern science. It is to be stressed that this justification lay in assigning the excluded nonextended, and therefore non-mechanical, characters a separate and fully acknowledged domain of their own, not in denying them reality; in other words, it lay in dualism, not in monism, and it automatically lapsed with the subsequent abandonment of the dualistic complement of materialism which, left to itself, became plain absurdity.
Yet this abandonment was inevitable because of the well-known theoretical difficulties inherent in Cartesian dualism. Its forte from the point of view of corporeal science, the mutual causal unrelatedness of the two orders of being, was also its mortal weakness. In consequence, Cartesian dualism broke up into two alternatives: and, while Berkleyan idealism and Leibnizian monadology boldly tried the side of the res cogitans, natural science had no option in its choice of "matter." Science, it is true, would like her choice to be understood in terms of method only: but there are those among her own proper objects which force her to face the issue of materialism on the ontological level.
These objects are living organisms, the mysterious meeting places of Descartes' two substances. Descartes nowhere proved the clarity and fearlessness of his metaphysical grasp more than in his famous machine theory of the animal body. Animals are nothing but automata, functioning according to the laws which govern res extensa generally. The logic of his argument applies, against Descartes' own will, to the human body as well, for from the point of view of the body, the coexistence of an ego is purely incidental. Having thus rid body of any intrinsic reference to mind, and the science of body of any obligation to account for the phenomena of mind, Descartes and the Cartesians could in complete good conscience treat the organism as just another instance of the res extensa, i.e., subject it to a purely mechanical analysis.
Modern biology no longer en joys such a good conscience. When it continues to treat the organism on the lines of purely extensional properties, as it is bound to do as a department of physical science, it does so under repudiation of a task of which it is no longer relieved by the dualistic alibi.
What is the new situation of life in the gamut of science? We have seen that to Descartes animal bodies were machines so constructed as to function in the way they do: this presupposes a constructor, viz. God, and though there is no purposiveness in their functioning itself, there was the purpose in their construction towards such functioning. In this, as in other more conspicuous respects, God was a necessary assumption in the system. Since materialism, however, was left without God and without independent mind, the whole constructive task devolved upon matter itself. The task was in fact twofold: first, matter must have produced by its own unguided and blind interplay those subtle systems we call organisms; and secondly, matter must continuously produce in certain of those systems, as a by-play of their particular organization, the phenomenon we call mind.
The first task alone would seem beyond the power of matter, considering the overwhelming odds against a mere chance production of systems having the order of complexity in question: and chance production it must be, for with the exclusion of purpose or any form of finalism from physical causality a guiding principle is no longer available. Without it, the emergence of the existing organic systems would seem no less improbable than the famous monkeys hammering out at random a work of art on their typewriters in the aeons at their disposal. Here the discovery of evolution intervened to make it possible to credit unaided matter more plausibly with the production of the living kingdom and thus to advance the materialistic monism of science by a decisive step. If living forms are descended from one an-46 THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY other and have not each arisen independently, then--except for the chance generation of the first and simplest fonn of life-all further shaking of the dice occurs in a confined dice-box, with select dice and circumscribed ways for them to be cast: so that the game of chance is vastly narrowed down. Also the effects of mutation accumulate within one strain, while the monkeys start at each moment anew. In addition to this self-limiting and cumulative functioning of mutation the working of natural selection on its results seemed to fill admirably the place of a directing principle vacated by teleology. Indeed it was the Darwinian theory of evolution, with this combination of chance variation and natural selection, which completed the extrusion of teleology from nature. Having become redundant even in the story of life, purpose retired wholly into subjectivity.
But this monistic solution of the first of the two problems does not bear too close inspection. According to the theory, natural selection in animal evolution operates largely, and increasingly so the higher we ascend in the evolutionary scale, through factors of the mental order. We need not go all the way to intelligence. Acuteness of sense, keenness of instinct, quickness of grasp and response, the general alertness of life, are among the endowments which decide survival and thus make the wheels of selection turn. Nay, the very urge to survive, a psychical fact in all its elementary functions (hunger, fear, aggression, lust), is itself indispensable for survival, just as it is responsible for there being a struggle for survival at all. The point is that these "subjective" or "inward" phenomena are accorded causal efficacy in the realm of material cause and effect, and that this efficacy is essential for making the evolutionist doctrine workable. But tills revokes the monistic basis of the doctrine, by readmitting in the selection part that teleology which had been ejected at SO heavy a cost in the variation part. For these phenomena are of a purposive nature, and with them purpose is once more slipped into the causal scheme of a natural science. This is just one illustration of the point we wish to make in this paper: that the fact of organic being, even as it wrecked Cartesian dualism on the rock of the psycho-physical problem, also spells the discomfiture of its heir, monistic materialism.
This inconsistency apart, the metaphysical importance of Darwinism lay in the attempt to credit the automatism of material nature with the generation of the branching and ascending life-forms. But by thus dispensing with the dualistic necessity for a creative principle different from the created, it drew upon lonesome matter also the full weight of a burden from which dualism had kept it free: the burden to account for the origin of mind. For the mental attributes are among the "sports" thrown up in the mechanics of organic mutation, and this genetic doctrine implies a more fundamental view of the relation of mind and body. The general formula of materialism is that mind is a function of body, and unilaterally so. The particulars of the formula are mainly devised to suit the interests of science, viz., to retain for science the methodological benefits of the preceding dualistic division, by preserving intact the closed causality of the material realm, and at the same time to make the newly assumed role of matter in the generation of mind so peripheral for matter itself as to leave the former concept of it unimpaired. This technical purpose is served by the theory of mind as an "epiphenomenon," i.e., a by-play of particular material processes in particular material systems (brains), these systems behaving in those processes entirely in accordance with the deterministic laws of matter. Now the only relevant aspect of "epiphenomenalism" lies in its negative implications. "Epiphenomenon" denotes an effect which, unlike all other effects in nature, does not consume the energy of its cause; it is not a transformation and continuation of such energy, and therefore, again unlike all other effects, it cannot become a cause itself. It is powerless in the absolute sense, a dead end of causality, past which the traffic of cause and effect rolls as if it were not there at all. Thus the closed system of material causality is safeguarded as effectively as in Cartesian dualism against any intrusion from without, and yet mind has heen made, under the stratagem of unilateral dependence, a part of that nature which cannot tolerate its interference.' But "epiphenomenalism" itself involves absurdities too obvious for philosophic readers to be dealt with here. We will be understood when we conclude this part of our inquiry with the statement that materialist monism, while ensuring to the res extensa the methodological fitness for science it had acquired in Cartesian dualism, avoids the latter's psycho-physical impasse oniy at the price of destroying any possible understanding of mind, nay by destroying the very idea of mind; and at the same time it adulterates the clean concept of matter by charging it with an occult faculty, viz., that of generating the "epiphenomenon." IV It may seem that the foregoing metaphysical considerations have led us far afield, since biology itself would claim that it need not pronounce on the psycho-physical problem at all, being concerned only with describing the material facts of organisms. And psychical 2We see once more how inadmissible from the materialist point of view is the causal use which the theory of natural selection makes of mental characters: facts, it is claimed, are connected with a particular group of organisms only, and when they emerge, at a late point in the evolutionary progress, they do so as something new and additional to what organism is by itself. We intend to show in another investigation' that this claim cannot be maintained, that indeed categories of inwardness are required in the most elementary description of organisms as living wholes (though not in the analysis of a mere part function within the whole). Here we resume the theme of our opening remarks. If organisms are treated in biology like any other objects of physical science, we have to state more precisely what the scientific supposition as such includes in, and what it excludes from, the idea of its object.
Here we can content ourselves with a brief enumeration of wellknown traits. The first is measurability, and this implies the whole Cartesian concept of reality as essentially extended. The second is uniformity of operation, and this in the mechanistic scheme means inertial uniformity whereby any dynamical result is already contained in the initial quantities, and itself is just a transitory stage in the continuance of motions whose only modus operandi is continuation after their original quantitative measure. This condition satisfies the requirements of calculability, i.e., accurate prediction. From this there follows, thirdly, that causes, whatever their kind and diversity, work always, as it were, from behind and never from ahead of a natural event, from something, but not towards something-in a word: causes are wholly antecedents. This time-relation is an essential aspect of efficient or mechanical causes, and is reflected in the saying that such causes are "blind." With the exclusive adoption by natural science of this concept of causality, an event is wholly explained by its past, and in no sense by its future, by what it was, not by what it is going to be. This complete shift from future to past rules teleology out as a matter of course. Teleological indifference is the logical complement to inertial uniformity.' Fourthly, physical phenomena are analysable into simple components, i.e., elementary units and motions, whose aimless and mutually independent interplay explains the resultant whole. Reality consists primarily of these isolated elements. The unity of the complex "whole" is a mere appearance due to the grossness of our senses or other deficiencies of knowledge, and dissolves with the progress of instrument-aided analysis. The action of the intrinsically unrelated factors in constituting a joint system is such that they are indifferent to this as to any result whatsoever. Here we have another aspect of what we listed before as teleological indifference. The indifference of the cause to its future effect is matched by the indifference of the part to the simultaneous whole it helps to constitute.
This indicates the second important exclusion, after that of final causes, with which the rising science struggled to free itself from the medieval tradition. "Substantial fonns," i.e., wholeness as a causative factor with respect to its constituent parts, and thus the ground of its own becoming, joined final causes in the interdiction imposed by natural science. In Newtonian physies the integral wholeness of form, on which classical and medieval ontology was based, is broken up into elementary factors for which the parallelogram of forces is the fitting graphical symbol. The presence of the future, formerly conceived as potentiality of becoming, consists now in the calculability of the operation of the forces discernible in a given configuration. And these forces are not considered as constituent of specific form but as the general and inevitable behaviour of matter left to itself. Form, no longer something original in its own right, is the current compromise between the basic actions of aggregate matter. The falling apple is not so much elevated to the rank of cosmic motion as the latter is brought down to the level of the falling apple. This establishes a new unity of the universe, but of a different complexion from the Greek one: the aristocracy of form is replaced by the democracy of matter. And it is to matter that mathematical analysis is directed in post-Renaissance physics.
The test of success in explanation (quite apart from success in technological application) seems to decide the issue between the two conflicting methods unequivocally in the modern's favour. But it is not surprising to find that with regard to the living organism the reconstruction of the whole out of its quantitatively defined elements and their type of causation, even granted the analysis to be complete, seems to fail utterly. The recombination of the analytically isolated parts will not show how and why the whole is alive, nor why it is a whole. This is not surprising because, as we have seen, the ontology of modern science which determines its method is primarily one of lifeless matter. Its leading terms reflect the features of reality minus life. Y ct science is obliged to apply these terms to living things too, inasmuch as these occupy space in cxtended reality. Here the want of a physically legitimate concept of wholeness, as distinct from a mere configurative complex of elements, proved a major disability in grasping the essential characteristics of organism.
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Today noteworthy attempts are being made by theoretical biologists to overcome this disability without stepping outside the ontological postulates of physical science. Such concepts as "system" and "hierarchy of systems," "forms and levels of organization," "strata of reality," "superimposed orders of dynamical law," are intended to supplant or supplement the "elementalistic" view of classical physics, and accordingly to qualify the exclusive claim of reductive method based on that view. Since these attempts, in so far as they come from the scientific camp, do not aim at the overthrow of the physical premises themselves, some sort of permission, as it were, is sought from physical science to accept the unity of the organism as representing an autonomous level of organization. It would then be possible to treat its dynamics, the peculiar laws of its total behaviour, as a datum sui generis, ultimate as far as description is concerned, and no less genuine than the dynamics of the more primitive levels of reality.
The irreducibility of "levels" thus admitted raises at once the question what relation, if not mere degree of complexity, obtains between the different strata of reality within one nature? Reducibility may be denied either on principle or on grounds of practicability. Only in the former case does the issue become a philosophical one, and will then turn on the concepts of "whole" and "fann," whose rehabilitation among physical terms is aimed at without such connotations as made them unacceptable to the founders of modern science. However, since these connotations concerned precisely the e fleetive aspect of "form" and "wholeness" in virtue of which they meant operative principles in the dynamics of nature, and since this aspect necessarily involves that of finalism and thus affects indeed the basic conception of causality and of matter, it may well be doubted whether, divested of these unpalatable implications, the concept of wholeness retains any precise meaning, and whether, otherwise, it is at all assimilable to the conceptual scheme of materialist science. For it must be borne in mind that analysis-what Galileo called the resolutive method-is by no means an optional method for the science of matter, but unavoidable so long as matter is conceived in terms of extension and quantity. If there is any truth in Leibniz' contention that extension is plurality ("repetition"), and extended objects therefore multiples, i.e. aggregates, and that being by aggregation has no reality other than that of the unities of which it consists, then cognition of any object qua extended must mean its resolution into the ultimate elements of quantity. In other words, the quantitative view is essentially "elementalistic." It might even be asked whether, in the purely material context, a "higher unity" is not a contradiction in terms. Nothing can be more deeply rooted in the nature of the case than that the smallest particle-of matter or energy-serves as the ultimate term of materialist ontology, just as, conversely, the integral whole, as exhibited in form, served as an ultimate term in classical ontology. In both cases the ultimate terms provide the last resort of intelligibility and therefore of explanation. They are, therefore, not open to revision without revising the whole conception of an object as such.
No such sweeping revision, however, is contemplated in the biological attempts we have mentioned. The intention is rather to make the concept of wholeness somehow available for structural and functional description, and to that extent to escape the analytical monopoly of physics, without infringing upon the ontology of physics itself ' which implies a ban on teleology. This would, if the concept of wholeness were taken seriously, amount to the attempt to make an omelette without breaking the eggs. But in fact the departure from physicalism is more apparent than rcal.' The pluralism of strata and their several laws is a penultimate doctrine. Surely, it cannot be meant that nature is not one? What, then, is the 'connection between the strata? Connection, with respect to laws, means the logical relation of special and general: with respect to objects, the ontological relation of complex and simple. The congruence of these two meanings is at the basis of natural science. The alternative would be a relation of potential and actual, with an inward principle of unfolding to replace the quantitative principle of extraneous combination. But "entelechies" have no place in the present scheme of science, and "vitalism" is discredited as an asylum ignorantiae. Thus there remain for the connection of physical levels only degrees of complexity in aggregation, and this requires, even if it docs not ensure the complete feasibility of, an elementalistic analysis. Indeed, the problem becomes just that of feasibility, and of possible release from the requirement. It is. the limits of our capacity of analysis and synthesis that we find adduced as a reason for accepting different levels of reality.' In other words, Laplace's model conception of a divine calculator, the unit terms of whose calculation are individual particles in space and time, is still implied ideally. But it is now recorded as a conception which human science cannot hope to achieve. What to us appears as a new order of functional law, must for him be completely transparent as to the elementary processes whose physical integration it is, and no novelty would remain, nor genuine wholeness either. The conceptual status of "wholes" is thus a mainly pragmatic or economical one. Science accepts different levels of description as if they were discontinuous, with the understanding that in physical fact there must be an unbroken train of derivation from the bottom upward, with no "ingression" of really new features. Physics would still be the last word with regard to every kind of structure, if only the road were passable.
This being so, our opening rEn1 2.rks on the position of biology visa-vis physics will stand. Biology, as a department of natural science, has to treat its subject-matter as physical entities: this means, as configurations of units of matter. The particular entities are distinguished by being alive. Yet, by the standards of what "scientific" means with regard to physical entities as such, biology is bound to exclude all categories of life from its explanatory scheme. The biological interpretation of life is necessarily in terms of the lifeless.
As part of the history of life's quest to know itself, materialistic biology is thus an attempt to apprehend life by eliminating that which constitutes the possibility of the attempt itself, viz., awareness and purpose. The attempt, therefore, in disowning itself as evidence of its subject-matter, contradicts itself in the understanding achieved of its subject-matter. In eliminating itself from the account it makes the account incomplete, yet does not admit a completion that would transcend the self-sufficiency of its principle, in virtue of which the account is closed in itself. Thus the attempt not only leaves itself unaccounted for, and unintelligible by its own terms: even more, with the "epiphenomenalist" depreciation of inwardness, it invalidates itself, by denying to thought a basis of possible validity in an entity already completely determined in terms of the thoughtless.
The philosophical question thus confronts us, whether the inwardness of life can be excluded from the understanding and faithful description of organisms. If the answer is in the negative, as the results of this inquiry imply, and if dualism offers no remedy, as its history shows, it is for ontology to overcome materialism by a new and non-quantitative theory of substance. nact 1aws for phenomena . .. of the organism as a whole, without the hopeless undertaking to press all individual physico-chemical processes into a gigantic formula." Ibid.~ 140-1.
